Today's Bundle

### India's dam network at a glance

India operates 6,628 specified large dams, making it the third-largest dam-owning nation after the United States and China. About 98.5% are owned by State Governments, with Central PSUs and private owners holding the rest. Maharashtra leads in numbers, followed by Madhya Pradesh and Gujarat. Most major dams are multipurpose — supporting irrigation, hydropower, drinking water, flood moderation and industrial supply — making safety failures simultaneously a livelihood, economic and disaster-risk concern. A 'specified dam' under the Dam Safety Act, 2021 generally means a dam above 15 metres in height, or between 10–15 m with specific design or reservoir characteristics; these are the dams brought under the central regulatory net.

### Key safety challenges

Ageing infrastructure is the foremost risk: 26% (1,681) of specified dams are over 50 years old, with several over a century old. Sedimentation has reduced average reservoir storage by ~19%, eroding flood-cushion and live-storage capacity. Seismic vulnerability was exposed by the 2001 Bhuj earthquake, which triggered liquefaction in the foundation of Chang Dam (Gujarat). Glacial Lake Outburst Floods (GLOFs) are a growing Himalayan threat — in October 2023, the South Lhonak Lake outburst flash-flood washed away the Chungthang Dam of the Teesta-III hydro project in Sikkim. Other stressors include shifting hydrological patterns under climate change, encroachment in spillway zones and weak emergency-action planning.

### DRIP — Dam Rehabilitation and Improvement Programme

DRIP is a multi-phase programme launched in 2012 with World Bank assistance to rehabilitate selected dams across India. Phase-I (2012–2020) covered around 223 dams in seven States. Phase-II and Phase-III (approved 2020–21) extend the scope to roughly 736 dams across 19 States and three Central agencies, with an outlay of about ₹10,211 crore over ten years, co-financed by the World Bank and Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB). DRIP funds structural rehabilitation, dam-safety inspections, emergency action plans (EAPs), instrumentation, training and the development of the DHARMA digital platform. It also supports research, dam-break analyses and capacity-building of dam owners.

### Dam Safety Act, 2021 — 4-tier structure

The Dam Safety Act, 2021 provides for surveillance, inspection, operation and maintenance of specified dams across India and creates a uniform regulatory architecture. Its four-tier institutional structure comprises: (i) National Committee on Dam Safety (NCDS) — evolves policy and recommends regulations; (ii) National Dam Safety Authority (NDSA) — implements policy, resolves inter-State disputes, regulates State agencies; (iii) State Committee on Dam Safety (SCDS) in each State; and (iv) State Dam Safety Organisations (SDSOs) for day-to-day surveillance. The Act mandates periodic and post-event inspections, comprehensive dam-safety reviews, emergency action plans, and penalties — including imprisonment — for obstruction or non-compliance.

### Digital and inspection initiatives

The Dam Health and Rehabilitation Monitoring Application (DHARMA) is the NDSA's web-based asset-management tool that digitises dam-safety data — design, instrumentation, inspections, incidents, repairs — for every specified dam. Mandatory pre-monsoon and post-monsoon inspections are required for all specified dams, with reports uploaded to DHARMA. The NDSA also publishes the National Dam Safety Policy, model emergency action plans, and Guidelines for Safety Inspection. Complementary initiatives include the Seismic Hazard Atlas for dams, GLOF early-warning systems for Himalayan reservoirs, and capacity-building under the National Water Academy (NWA), Pune. The Supreme Court has, in recent hearings, flagged uneven State-level implementation, especially delays in constituting SCDS/SDSOs and finalising EAPs.

### Way forward

Experts urge risk-based prioritisation — focusing rehabilitation funds on the highest-hazard, highest-consequence dams rather than uniform State-wise allocation. Decommissioning of obsolete or unsafe dams must become a legitimate policy option, as in the United States. Sediment management through flushing, sluicing and watershed treatment can recover storage. GLOF risk demands dynamic operating rules and downstream early-warning. Finally, independent dam-safety audits, public disclosure of inspection reports through DHARMA, and stronger penalties under the 2021 Act are needed for genuine accountability. The Dam Safety Act 2021's central-State balance — challenged by some States as encroaching on water, a State subject — remains under judicial scrutiny.

### What are undersea cables?

Submarine (undersea) cables are fibre-optic cables laid on the ocean floor that carry data between continents. They are the literal backbone of the modern internet: estimates suggest they carry between 95% and 99% of all international data traffic, dwarfing the share carried by satellites. Each cable is about the diameter of a garden hose, with the fibre core protected by steel armouring, insulation and a sheath. Repeaters every ~50–80 km amplify the optical signal. Cables are generally laid and owned by consortia of telecom operators, increasingly joined by hyperscalers like Google, Meta, Microsoft and Amazon, who lease or directly own dedicated capacity to connect their data centres.

### Why they matter strategically

Subsea cables are far more efficient, cost-effective and reliable than satellites for bulk data: a single modern cable can carry hundreds of terabits per second. Almost every inter-bank transfer, stock trade, video call, military command, intelligence sharing and cloud-service interaction between countries crosses these cables. The UN General Assembly in 2010 explicitly described submarine cables as 'critical communication infrastructure' under international law. Damage to a cable does not merely slow down social media — it can paralyse payment systems, stock exchanges, business-process operations and military communications within minutes. This is why their physical and cyber security has become a top-tier national security concern.

### Digital chokepoints — where cables converge

Although the seafloor is vast, undersea cables tend to follow a few narrow maritime corridors for geographic and political reasons. These corridors — the Red Sea, Strait of Hormuz, Suez Canal, Strait of Malacca, Bab-el-Mandeb, and the Luzon Strait — are now described as 'digital chokepoints'. The Red Sea alone carries cables linking Europe, the Gulf and Asia; 2024 cable cuts there disrupted internet services across multiple countries. The Strait of Hormuz is similarly cable-dense and now in the spotlight after Iran's proposal. Cable redundancy — laying alternative routes around Africa, across the Arctic, or via Central Asia — is a strategic countermeasure that several governments and tech firms are now pursuing.

### Iran's IRGC proposal — what's new

Iranian state-media reports indicate that the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) — Iran's most powerful armed force, established after the 1979 Islamic Revolution — has proposed levying licensing fees and annual 'protection' payments from foreign telecom and tech firms (including Meta, Amazon and Microsoft) whose cables transit the Strait of Hormuz. The IRGC, which operates independently of Iran's regular military and reports to the Supreme Leader, also controls the Basij Resistance Force and Iran's maritime militias. The proposal is significant because it represents a state actor attempting to monetise — and potentially weaponise — control over a digital chokepoint, blurring the line between sovereign jurisdiction, commercial extortion and grey-zone coercion.

### Threat landscape

Key threats to undersea cables include: State-sponsored intervention (e.g., the IRGC's protection-fee proposal); grey-zone warfare, where ambiguous actors (e.g., shadow fleets, dual-use trawlers) sever cables through anchor drags or sabotage drones; espionage and cyber threats, including state-sponsored wiretapping and attacks on network-management systems; physical accidents from fishing trawlers and seismic events; and chokepoint convergence, where many cables share a narrow corridor. The 2024 Red Sea incidents — widely linked to Houthi-related disruption and anchor drags from a damaged vessel — knocked out cables like AAE-1, SEACOM and EIG, slowing internet across Asia and West Asia.

### Implications for India

India is among the world's most cable-dependent economies. Its IT-BPM industry (Information Technology – Business Process Management) — which exported over US$200 billion in services in FY24 — relies on uninterrupted global connectivity. Indian stock-trading and banking systems depend on millisecond-grade cable links to London, Singapore and New York. The Strait of Hormuz and Red Sea both lie astride the India–West Asia and India–Europe corridors, including the India–Middle East–Europe Economic Corridor (IMEC). Disruptions therefore translate directly into financial risk, IT-services SLAs and strategic communications. India is responding with new domestic cable landings (Mumbai, Chennai, Trivandrum, Tuticorin), participation in the Meta 50,000-km cable, and policy thinking around a cable-protection framework.

### Early life and education

Sukhdev Thapar was born on 15 May 1907 in Ludhiana, Punjab, to Ramlal Thapar and Ralli Devi. He was raised partly by his uncle Lala Achint Ram, a prominent freedom fighter in Lahore, in an atmosphere already steeped in nationalist politics. He studied at National College, Lahore, founded by Lala Lajpat Rai as a 'national' alternative to Government colleges — the same institution that produced Bhagat Singh, Bhagwati Charan Vohra and several other future revolutionaries. National College became the crucible where Sukhdev imbibed both Indian nationalism and the socialist literature that would shape his politics. By his late teens he had given up the prospect of a settled professional career, choosing instead the path of revolutionary nationalism.

### Naujawan Bharat Sabha and HSRA

In 1926, along with Bhagat Singh and others, Sukhdev co-founded the Naujawan Bharat Sabha in Lahore — a youth organisation that combined cultural nationalism with secular, socialist ideas and sought to mobilise students and workers against colonial rule. Sukhdev was its principal organiser in Punjab. The Sabha became one of the channels feeding revolutionaries into the older Hindustan Republican Association (HRA), founded in 1924 under leaders such as Sachindranath Sanyal and Ram Prasad Bismil. After a famous meeting at Feroz Shah Kotla, Delhi in September 1928, the HRA was reconstituted as the Hindustan Socialist Republican Association (HSRA), explicitly committed to the goal of a socialist republic through armed revolution. Sukhdev became a key strategist of the HSRA's Punjab unit.

### Saunders killing and Lahore Conspiracy Case

On 17 November 1928, Lala Lajpat Rai died of injuries from a lathi charge ordered against an anti-Simon Commission protest in Lahore. The HSRA decided to retaliate. On 17 December 1928, Bhagat Singh and Shivaram Rajguru shot dead John P. Saunders, an Assistant Superintendent of Police, outside the District Police Headquarters in Lahore — they had actually intended to kill James A. Scott, the officer who had ordered the lathi charge. Sukhdev Thapar was a central planner of the operation. Following the Central Assembly bomb-throwing (8 April 1929) by Bhagat Singh and Batukeshwar Dutt, a sweeping investigation drew Sukhdev in. He was charged in the Lahore Conspiracy Case, a special tribunal trial held under an ordinance with limited defence rights.

### Martyrdom on 23 March 1931

On 7 October 1930, the special tribunal sentenced Bhagat Singh, Sukhdev Thapar and Shivaram Rajguru to death, while several other accused received life imprisonment. Despite nationwide appeals and a Round Table Conference unfolding in London, the British colonial authorities went ahead with executions, advancing them by a day. The three were hanged on the evening of 23 March 1931 in Lahore Central Jail, their bodies hurriedly cremated on the banks of the Sutlej near Hussainiwala to prevent public mourning. The trio's deaths set off massive protests across India, helped consolidate the 'revolutionary' strand of the freedom struggle, and made March 23 a permanent date of national remembrance — Shaheed Diwas (Martyrs' Day).

### Legacy and values

Sukhdev Thapar is remembered today not merely as a martyr but as a strategic mind of the HSRA — the comrade who, alongside Bhagat Singh, helped translate revolutionary fervour into organised planning. His brief life reflects the values of sacrifice, patriotism, intellectual courage and valour. He is commemorated through the Hussainiwala National Martyrs' Memorial (Firozpur, Punjab), where the trio were cremated; through 15 May as his birth anniversary; and through 23 March as Shaheed Diwas. Several State and Central institutions — schools, blocks, public squares — bear his name. Government schemes and military training institutions invoke the HSRA legacy as a model of selfless service to the nation.

### Why a maritime insurance pool?

Global maritime insurance is dominated by London, the EU and a handful of P&I clubs — the International Group of P&I Clubs alone covers around 90% of global ocean-going tonnage. Recent shocks — the Russia–Ukraine war (2022), Red Sea Houthi attacks (2023–24), Iran-sanctions tensions and shadow-fleet scrutiny — have caused war-risk premia to spike and forced sudden withdrawals of cover for Indian-linked or sanctioned-region trade. With India increasingly trading via the Indian Ocean Region, Strait of Hormuz and Red Sea, exposure to such cover disruptions threatens both crude-oil security and exports. The Bharat Maritime Insurance Pool is India's response — a sovereign-backed pool that ensures continuous and predictable cover for Indian-flagged or India-bound shipping, even when foreign re/insurance withdraws.

### Structure and capacity

The BMI Pool is housed under the Department of Financial Services (DFS), Ministry of Finance. It pools the underwriting capacity of domestic general insurers and reinsurers under a single, sovereign-backed instrument. Its key parameters are: a Pool underwriting capacity of US$1.5 billion, a sovereign guarantee of ₹12,980 crore (~US$1.4 billion) as a backstop, and a combined domestic underwriting capacity of approximately ₹950 crore. Coverage extends to Hull and Machinery (the ship and its engines), Cargo, Protection and Indemnity (P&I), and War risks — the four major lines of marine insurance — for Indian-flagged or Indian-controlled vessels and for vessels sailing to or from India, regardless of flag. Domestic insurers issue policies using the combined capacity of pool members, allowing for shared risk and standardised pricing.

### Governance and pool administrator

The Pool Administrator is GIC Re (General Insurance Corporation of India), India's premier reinsurer and one of the top 10 reinsurers globally by gross premium. GIC Re acts as the lead operational manager — handling underwriting, pricing, claims and reinsurance retrocession. Two bodies oversee policy and risk: a Governing Body sets policy and broad operational guidelines, and an Underwriting Committee oversees risk management, premium-setting, war-zone definitions and reserves. Claims handling follows a two-tier waterfall: claims up to US$100 million are paid out of the Pool's own capacity; claims exceeding $100 million trigger the sovereign guarantee as a contingent backstop of last resort. This structure mirrors hybrid pool-and-guarantee models used in other strategic-insurance pools globally.

### Addressing geopolitical volatility and sanctions

Rising geopolitical volatility — Red Sea attacks on shipping, Strait of Hormuz tensions, sanctions on Russia, Iran and others — has hit global maritime insurance in three ways: war-risk premia have risen sharply, foreign reinsurers have abruptly withdrawn cover for sanctioned trades, and ship-owners face mid-voyage cancellations. The BMI Pool is designed precisely for these scenarios — providing continuous Indian-anchored cover for sensitive routes, shielding India's energy and trade flows, and reducing the risk that sanctions on a third country (e.g., Russia or Iran) leave Indian vessels stranded. By absorbing these tail risks domestically, India aims to trade sovereignly through the Red Sea, Strait of Hormuz and Indian Ocean Region even in conflict scenarios.

### Strategic significance for India

India today owns only about 1–1.2% of the global merchant fleet by deadweight tonnage, despite handling roughly 70% of its trade value and 95% by volume by sea. The mismatch generates a heavy insurance and freight forex outflow. The BMI Pool is part of a broader push that includes the Maritime India Vision 2030, the Maritime Amrit Kaal Vision 2047, the proposed Shipping Development Fund, and incentives for Indian flagging of vessels. Strategically, the Pool helps build domestic underwriting expertise, reduces dependence on London-based re/insurance, deepens India's claim to maritime financial-services hub status, and complements national-security goals by ensuring that Indian shipping is not held hostage to foreign insurance withdrawals during crises.

### Comparable models elsewhere

Several countries operate sovereign-backed maritime or war-risk pools. The US Maritime Security Program provides assured access to ocean lift, while UK Pool Re is a terrorism-reinsurance pool. China's COSCO Shipping Captive Insurance and similar Russian pools illustrate how strategic shipping is increasingly insured domestically. Within India, the Indian Maritime Insurance Consortium and prior ad-hoc government-backed cover for Russian crude tankers were precursors. The BMI Pool consolidates these efforts into a single, statutorily-backstopped vehicle. It is also expected to interact with broader Indian financial-sector initiatives, including the IRDAI's push for marine-product innovation and the IFSCA-regulated reinsurance hub at GIFT City.